Abstract-This paper develops a criterion to assess equalization of opportunity that is consistent with theoretical views of equality of opportunity. We characterize inequality of opportunity as a situation where some groups in society enjoy an illegitimate advantage. In this context, equalization of opportunity requires that the extent of the illegitimate advantage enjoyed by the privileged groups falls. Robustness requires that this judgment be supported by the broadest class of individual preferences. We formalize this criterion in a decision-theoretic framework and derive an empirical condition for equalization of opportunity based on observed opportunity distributions. The criterion is used to assess the effectiveness of child care at equalizing opportunity among children, using quantile treatment effects estimates of a major child care reform in Norway. Overall, we find strong evidence supporting equalization of opportunity.
I. Introduction
A N important goal for public policy is to promote equality of opportunity-to let individual success be determined by merit rather than by social background. Assessing whether public intervention succeeds at leveling the playing field among citizens thus represents a key issue for policy evaluation. But what criterion should be used to conduct such an evaluation? Unfortunately, while an abundant literature has been devoted to define equality of opportunity, it offers little guidance for assessing how far a given distribution is from the equality of opportunity goal. The contribution of this paper is to define a theoretical criterion of equalization of opportunity, understood as a reduction in the extent of inequality of opportunity, and to apply this criterion to policy evaluation.
Theories of equality of opportunity (EOP) draw a distinction between fair inequality, arising from differences in individual effort, and unfair inequality arising from differences in individual circumstances, that is, the determinants of success for which society deems the individual not to be responsible (Dworkin, 1981; Roemer, 1998; Fleurbaey, 2008) . Define a type as a given set of circumstances and an opportunity set as the set of feasible outcomes for each type. The EOP principle requires that no type is advantaged compared to other types in the sense of having access to a more favorable opportunity set.
This principle allows assessing whether a given distribution satisfies equality of opportunity. However, it does not allow comparing two societies where equality of opportunity is not satisfied. This is an important limitation in many contexts, including policy evaluation and comparisons of inequality across time and space.
To address this limitation, some authors have relied on scalar indices of inequality of opportunity.
1 While consistent with the EOP principles, this approach raises concerns of robustness because it relies on two restrictive assumptions. First, it requires summarizing the advantage enjoyed by a type in a scalar measure-for example, the mean income conditional on type.
2 But these scalar measures may mask important features of the distribution of opportunity. Second, the index approach relies on specific welfare functions to aggregate differences in advantage between types. Therefore, it draws on specific a priori preference orderings that may violate the preferences of individuals in society. As a result, inequality of opportunity indices often lack robustness and generality.
Our main contribution is to alleviate these shortcomings and develop a robust criterion that allows comparing different societies according to their degree of inequality of opportunity. We characterize a society by the opportunity sets it offers to each type. Endowed with her own preferences, each individual in society is able to compare the opportunity sets of the different types. Our equalization of opportunity (EZOP) criterion states that inequality of opportunity is higher in social state 0 than in social state 1, if and only if all individuals in society, regardless of their preferences, agree that the unfair advantage enjoyed by the "privileged" types is lower in state 1 than in state 0, where different states might correspond to different countries, time periods, or policy regimes.
Contrary to the index approach, our criterion does not rely on a priori value functions to assess the advantage enjoyed by each type. Instead, we use the potential preferences over opportunity sets of individuals in society and allow for heterogeneity in these preferences. This raises an important issue of identification. In practice, we observe (at best) only the opportunity sets of each type, not individual preferences. Hence, it is not feasible to verify for each particular preference whether the advantage of privileged types is lower in one particular state. Instead, we would like to define a tractable condition, involving the distribution of opportunity sets alone, that would imply that our equalization criterion is satisfied. We show that such a condition can be defined using the tools of stochastic dominance. Of course, this can be achieved only within a specified family of preferences. In this paper, we focus mainly on the rank-dependent representation of preferences (Yaari, 1987) , although the analysis can be adapted to other classes of preferences.
The robustness and generality of our ranking criterion rests on the requirement of a consensus across individuals in their comparison of social states. We investigate the existence of such a consensus and show that our identification condition can be applied only when individuals agree on the ranking of types in each social state, that is, when individuals agree on which types are advantaged. If individuals disagree, they cannot unanimously agree on equalization of opportunity. It is possible, however, to identify subclasses of preferences within which individuals agree on the ranking of types in each state and to single out necessary and sufficient conditions for equalization within these subclasses of preferences. Our criterion is demanding in requiring that equalization occurs for each pairwise comparison of a possibly large number of types. We discuss how it can be relaxed by allowing the advantage of each type to be aggregated within society. We also discuss the consequences of imperfectly observing the relevant determinants of outcome for the implementation of our equalization criterion.
Finally, we show the usefulness of our framework by applying it to the evaluation of child care policy in Norway. In this respect, we also contribute to the literature on early childhood investments. 3 We follow Mogstad (2011, 2015) in considering how the introduction of universally available child care in Norway affected children's adult earnings. To estimate counterfactual distributions, we estimate quantile treatment effects, exploiting the spatial and temporal variation of the expansion in a difference-in-differences setup. We allow impacts across the distribution to vary flexibly with family background. Overall, our results suggest that the child care expansion significantly equalized opportunities between children from most, though not all, family backgrounds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses equalization of opportunity in a simplified setting with two types. Section III considers the general case with multiple levels of effort and circumstances. Section IV presents the application.
II. Equalization of Opportunity: A Simplified Setting
In this section, we define equality of opportunity and provide a formal statement of our equalization criterion in a simplified setting. Next, we discuss identification conditions.
3 For a survey, see, e.g., Almond and Currie (2011) and their references.
A. Definition of Equality of Opportunity
Let y ∈ R + denote an individual outcome, and let the determinants of the outcome be partitioned into four groups: Circumstances capture determinants that are not considered legitimate sources of inequality and are denoted by c. Effort captures determinants that are considered legitimate sources of inequality and is denoted by e. Luck captures factors that are considered legitimate sources of inequality as long as they affect individual outcomes in a neutral way given circumstances and effort; it is denoted by l. 4 Finally, outcomes are contingent on a binary social state, denoted π. All individuals in a society share the social state but may be affected differently. For instance, π = 0 may denote society without a specific policy intervention, while π = 1 denotes society with the policy or π may indicate different periods or countries that one would like to compare.
Let a type denote the set of individuals sharing similar circumstances. Given their type, level of effort, and the social state, the opportunity set offered to individuals can be summarized by the cumulative distribution function F π (y|c, e) or, equivalently, by its conditional quantile function F −1 π (p|c, e), for all ranks p in [0,1].
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EOP theories emphasize that inequality due to differences in circumstances is morally or politically objectionable, while inequality originating from differences in effort is legitimate. Based on this principle, equality of opportunity requires that the opportunity sets of individuals with similar effort be identical regardless of circumstances. Hence, for a given social state π, EOP requires that for any effort e, for any pair of circumstances (c, c ), and for every y, we have
This condition embodies the core of the equality of opportunity principle, as discussed, for instance, in Roemer (1998) , Lefranc et al. (2009), and Roemer and Trannoy (2016) . 
B. A Criterion for Equalization of Opportunity
Ranking social states. The previous definition can be used to rank social states. The empirical analysis in Lefranc et al. (2009) builds on this idea. However, it distinguishes only between states where EOP is satisfied and states where EOP is not satisfied, which leads to a very partial ranking.
In order to obtain a less partial ranking, various authors have resorted to specific inequality indices to quantify the 4 For a discussion of the ethical distinction among these three classes of determinants see Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2009) and Lefranc and Trannoy (2017) . 5 If the cumulative distribution function is only left continuous, we define F −1 π by the left continuous inverse distribution of
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These inequality measures embody specific social preferences with respect to inequality between types and to the within-type dispersion of outcomes. Inequality of opportunity indices have two main limitations. First, they lack generality, as each index relies on specific parametric formulations of social preferences. Second, they embed specific preferences of the social planner that agree with the EOP principles but might violate individual preferences over outcomes.
Our objective is to provide a robust criterion that allows comparing social states in situations where EOP is not satisfied. The intuition behind our ranking criterion is the following. If EOP is not satisfied, then individuals are not indifferent between the opportunity sets offered to different types. Behind a thin veil of ignorance, where individuals know their effort and have preferences over opportunity sets, everyone should be able to rank circumstances according to the economic advantage or disadvantage that they confer. Our criterion for ranking social states is based on the evaluation of the extent of the economic advantage enjoyed by the advantaged types in society. To ensure robustness, our equalization of opportunity criterion (EZOP) requires unanimity across all admissible preferences in society in assessing that the unfair advantage attached to more favorable circumstances decreases.
For expositional purposes, we start by formalizing the equalization criterion in a simplified setting with only two types, c and c that exert a common effort level e. To simplify notation, we let F π (.) (resp. F π (.)) denote the CDF of y for type c (resp. c ) at effort e in policy state π, that is, F π (.|c, e) (resp. F π (.|c , e)). Section III provides a generalization with many types and effort levels.
The EZOP criterion. We assume that each individual is endowed with cardinal preferences over risky outcomes. Let W (F ) denote the utility of a lottery with cumulative distribution F , and let P denote the class of individual preferences. For an individual with preferences W ∈ P, the economic advantage or disadvantage of type c relative to
. This quantity is positive if the individual with preferences W prefers F π to F π , while it is equal to 0 if EOP holds between types c and c . We refer to the absolute value of the welfare gap as the economic distance between types according to preferences W . The equalization of opportunity criterion rests on the difference in economic advantage across social states, as captured by the following definition: Definition 1 (EZOP: equalization of opportunity between two types). Moving from state π = 0 to π = 1 equalizes opportunity between circumstances c and c , at effort e on the 7 See Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) and Ferreira and Peragine (2016) for a survey.
8 For a discussion, see Chakravarty and Dutta (1987) .
set of preferences P, if and only if, for all preferences W
The equalization of opportunity criterion defines a social ordering requiring unanimity among potential individual preferences. It has several key properties that are worth emphasizing. First, in line with the theory of EOP, ranking state 1 above state 0 requires that the unfair economic advantage enjoyed by the privileged type be smaller in state 1 than in 0. Second, the criterion satisfies an anonymity condition with respect to the identity of the advantaged type: only the absolute value of the economic advantage, but not its sign, should matter for assessing equalization of opportunity. Third, it requires that the ranking be robust to a broad class of individual preferences. Fourth, in line with most of the inequality literature, the EZOP criterion focuses only on the difference in welfare across types, not on the level of welfare in each social state. This view implies that an overall reduction in aggregate welfare in society could lead to a reduction in inequality of opportunity, provided that the welfare gaps across types also fall. To address such cases, the EZOP criterion can be complemented by further requiring that average welfare or the welfare of the worse-off type does not fall when moving from state 0 to state 1. 9 Last, our EZOP criterion takes into account the absolute welfare gap between types. As a complement to this absolute perspective, a relative view can be developed by focusing on the distribution of income shares across types, as discussed in section IIIB. below.
C. Identification under the Rank-Dependent Utility Model
The identification problem. The EZOP criterion is contingent on the choice of the class of preferences P. If the set of individual preferences W in society was known, we could directly check whether the equalization condition holds. In practice, we know only the outcome distributions under the two policy states, not individual preferences. Therefore, the condition in definition 1 cannot be directly assessed.
To make the equalization criterion relevant, we need to reformulate it in terms of a restriction that involves only the outcome distributions of the different types in the alternative states. This cannot be achieved without imposing restrictions on the class P of individual preferences. Two possible alternative representations of preferences under risk have been widely studied and adopted in decision theory: the expected utility model and the rank-dependent model of Yaari (1987) . In the rest of the paper, we focus on the rank-dependent class, 9 Peragine (2002) offers an alternative criterion that focuses on social welfare improvement, in a sequential way, by giving priority to welfare gains for the least privileged types. This criterion is not consistent with the EZOP criterion in definition 1. Assume that F 0 = F 1 and W (F 1 ) > W (F 0 ) > W (F 0 ) for every preference W ∈ P. Moving from π = 0 to π = 1 satisfies the sequential dominance criterion as the welfare of the lowest type stays unchanged and the welfare of the lowest two types improves. Yet the welfare gap between types has increased, hence rejecting EZOP.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
which we denote by R. 10 In the rest of this section, we concentrate on the following question: What minimal conditions need to be imposed on the set of distributions F 0 , F 0 , F 1 , F 1 to ensure that equalization is satisfied for all preferences in R?
The rank-dependent model assumes that the welfare derived from a risky distribution F can be written as a weighted average of all possible realizations, where the weights are a function of the rank of the realization in the distribution of outcomes. Formally, let w(p) ≥ 0 denote the weight assigned to the outcome at percentile p. The welfare derived from F can then be written as
Under the rank-dependent model, the economic distance between types is given by
where (F, F , p) is the cumulative distribution gap between F and F . We refer to the graph of (., ., .) as the gap curve and to the graph of | (., ., .)| as the absolute gap curve.
Necessary condition for EZOP. From equation (2), a necessary condition for EZOP is that the cumulative distribution gap under π = 1 be smaller, in absolute value, compared to the gap under π = 0, at all percentiles. We refer to this as absolute gap curve dominance of π = 1 over π = 0.
Proposition 1. EZOP is satisfied on the set of preferences
Proofs of this and subsequent propositions are given in the online supplemental appendix, section A. The intuition of the proof is that if the absolute gap curve increases, there always exists a preference in R for which the unfair economic advantage increases. Note that absolute gap curve dominance is not a sufficient condition for EZOP. Whether a reduction in the gap between type c and c amounts to a reduction in advantage will depend on which of the two groups is consid-10 In addition to their tractability in empirical evaluations, the rankdependent family of preferences resolves important paradoxes in the theory of choice under risk (see, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Quiggin, 1981) . It also has a unique position in empirical welfare analysis in providing theoretical underpinnings for the widely used Gini index (see Sen, 1974) . Our framework is not confined, however, to the rank-dependent family and could be extended to other families of preferences. For instance, equalization conditions can be derived for the class of von Neumann expected utility preferences. The online appendix provides such conditions under first-order dominance.
11 Formally, one requires that
ered to be advantaged. Because the assessment of which type is advantaged may differ over the set of possible preferences, the requirement for EZOP over all possible preferences must be stronger than what is imposed by absolute gap curve dominance. For instance, assume that the distribution of type c dominates the distribution of type c over some interval. This does not imply, in the general case, that type c dominates c over the entire support of the distribution. Henceforth, some preferences might rank c better than c. Now assume that gap curve dominance is satisfied over this interval and that gap curves are similar in both social states otherwise. In this case, preferences that rank c better than c will conclude that the cardinal advantage of c has increased. This contradicts EZOP.
Necessary and sufficient condition under stochastic dominance. A corollary of this discussion is that if individuals agree on the ranking of types, they should also agree in their ranking of social states under gap curve dominance. We now examine this case.
As Muliere and Scarsini (1989) , among others, discussed, unanimity in ranking distributions F π better than F π will be achieved for all preferences in R if and only if distribution F π stochastically dominates distribution F π . This is equivalent to requiring inverse stochastic dominance at order 1, which we denote F π ISD1 F π . This holds whenever the graph of F 
12
In this section, we assume that this condition is satisfied.
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If so, all preferences in R unanimously rank type c better than type c . A fall in the cumulative distribution gap then has unambiguous consequences for the change in the economic distance between types. In fact, since the sign of the cumulative distribution gap is constant across all percentiles, the economic distance can be expressed as an increasing function of the absolute income gap:
This proposition establishes that when individuals agree on the ranking of types, gap curve dominance provides a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP. This contrasts with the situation where preferences do not agree on the ranking of types, in which case, gap curve dominance provides only a necessary condition for EZOP. In order to evaluate EZOP in such situations, we next consider refinements on the admissible set of preferences.
Restricted consensus on EZOP. When types cannot be ranked unambiguously, the cumulative distribution gap is no longer sufficient to infer EZOP. Our objective is to identify the minimal refinement on the set of admissible preferences that allows unambiguous assessments of equalization of opportunity. In line with Aaberge, Havnes, and Mogstad (2014) , we show that it is always possible to find a subset of R over which individuals agree on the ranking of types. Furthermore, on this subset, one can establish a necessary and sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity.
Let us first consider the special case where F π second-order stochastic dominates F π for all π ∈ {0, 1}, which we denote F π ISD2 F π . This holds whenever the graph of the integral of F −1 π with respect to p (the generalized Lorenz curve) lies above the graph of the corresponding integral of F −1 π . Define R 2 ⊂ R as the set of risk-averse rank-dependent preferences.
14 As is well known, all risk-averse preferences rank distribution functions consistently with second-order dominance. It follows that all preferences in R 2 will rank type c better than c in both states. Furthermore, the advantage of c over c can be expressed as an increasing function of the integral of the cumulative distribution gap. Analogous to the above, a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP over the set of preferences R 2 is then that the integrated cumulative distribution gap falls at all percentiles. This is established in the following proposition:
Finally, consider the case where distributions cannot be ranked by second-order dominance. In this case, consensus over the ranking of types cannot be reached in the class R 2 . However, it is possible to refine the set of preferences to where they agree on the ranking of types. Following Aaberge (2009) , consider the subset R k defined by
where w(p) = p 0 w(t )dt is the cumulative weighting scheme. The sequence of subsets of the type R k defines a nested partition of R where
Various papers have examined the relationship between inverse stochastic dominance and the ordering of distributions according to preferences in R k (Muliere & Scarsini, 1989; 14 This set contains all evaluation functions with weights decreasing in outcomes, that is, that have w (p) < 0.
15 Note that k is a measure of the effect of a precise sequence of restrictions on all possible cumulative weighting schemes w(p) defined on R. Hence, k indicates the risk attitude of preferences contained in R k . Zoli, 2002) . Aaberge et al. (2014) provide a general treatment and show that for any order k, all preferences in R k will prefer F π over F π if and only if F π inverse stochastic dominates F π at order k. Furthermore, as we show in the online appendix, any pair of distributions can always be ranked by inverse stochastic dominance for a sufficiently high finite order. Define κ as the minimal order at which F π and F π can be ranked using inverse stochastic dominance in both states, and denote kth order inverse stochastic dominance by ISDk . Without loss of generality, assume that F π ISDκ F π for all π ∈ {0, 1}, such that preferences in R κ agree on the ranking of types in both states. 16 To proceed, it is helpful to introduce the following notation:
In line with the notation above, also define
If, for all π ∈ {0, 1}, F π ISDκ F π , then for all preferences W ∈ R κ , the advantage of type c over type c under policy π is an increasing function of κ (F π , F π , p). As a consequence, EZOP will be satisfied on the set of preferences R κ if and only if κ (F π , F π , p) is smaller under π = 1 than under π = 0. This is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP under a less stringent dominance condition than in propositions 2 and 3. At the same time, the set of preferences over which it allows identifying EZOP is more restrictive. Finally, since there always exists an integer κ that allows ranking types, proposition 4 establishes a necessary condition for EZOP over the entire class R.
D. Discussion
Several features of our equalization criterion are worth discussing further. First, our criterion relies on the individuals' own preferences rather than on an external social welfare function. This is consistent with the no-envy criterion (Fleurbaey, 2008) , which requires that individuals with given preferences and effort be indifferent between the opportunity sets of the different types. Hence, the advantage that privileged types enjoy represents a measure of the degree of envy for given preferences. Second, the criterion is general in the sense that it does not place any restriction on the preferences of individuals. The degree of heterogeneity of preferences across the population is clearly unobservable. The focus is therefore on the class of potential preferences these individuals may have. Third, the criterion does not in itself require that individuals agree on the ranking of types, only that they agree on the reduction in the absolute gap between the different types. In other words, our criterion requires a consensus on the reduction of the advantage but not on the identity of the advantaged type. Finally, the criterion does not require summarizing the opportunity sets of the different types by a scalar measure as is often done in the literature on the measurement of inequality of opportunity.
The results obtained under the rank-dependent assumption also call for further comments. They lead us to distinguish between two cases. The case where individuals agree on the ranking of types under each social state is straightforward, as proposition 2 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity. In the case where individuals do not agree on the ranking of types, however, proposition 1 provides a necessary condition for equalization. Violation of this condition rules out equalization. Otherwise, proposition 4 allows one to endogenously identify a restricted set of preferences over which unanimity might be reached regarding equalization of opportunity. Of course, this provides only a partial judgment over equalization of opportunity. In fact, the higher the order κ required to successfully rank opportunity sets, the less general the judgment will be.
The restrictions on preferences required to achieve a consensus on the ranking of types may, however, be more directly informative. When weak restrictions are required to achieve a consistent ranking, then most individuals should agree on which type is advantaged. On the contrary, when stronger restrictions are required, there may be widespread disagreement on which type is advantaged. In this case, one might argue that a weak form of equality of opportunity already prevails. Lefranc et al. (2009) introduce the notion of weak equality of opportunity to single out situations where the opportunity sets differ across types but cannot be ranked unanimously among agents with risk-averse preferences. By capturing the degree of consensus about the advantaged type among potential preferences, κ helps generalize this notion of weak equality of opportunity.
To summarize, when there is widespread disagreement on which type is advantaged (high κ), our criterion provides a very partial condition for consensus on equalization of opportunity, although this admittedly corresponds to a case of weak inequality of opportunity. On the contrary, when there is large agreement on which type is advantaged (low κ), our equalization condition becomes least partial and turns into a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP in the case where there is full consensus on the identity of the advantaged type (κ = 1).
III. Equalization of Opportunity: Generalization
In the general case, opportunity equalization has to be assessed with more than two circumstances, across many effort levels. When effort is observable, one possibility is to extend the EZOP comparisons to all pairs of circumstances at every effort level or to study meaningful aggregations of these judgments. We discuss both extensions in this section. Identification criteria when effort is not observable are also discussed in order to provide relevant notions of equalization that can still be used in applied analysis under observability constraints.
A. Extending the EZOP Criterion to Multiple Circumstances
We consider the case in which there are T types. Let C = {c 1 , . . . , c i , . . . c T } denote the set of possible circumstances. For simplicity, we assume a single-effort level e. The results of this section can be easily extended to multiple effort levels (see section IIIC).
A straightforward extension of definition 1 to multiple circumstances is to require that for every possible pair of circumstances, the unfair gap falls when moving from social state π = 0 to π = 1. This is given by the following definition:
Definition 2 (EZOP between multiple types). Moving from state π = 0 to π = 1 equalizes opportunity over the set of circumstances C, at effort e, on the set of preferences P, if and only if, for all preferences W ∈ P, for all
) . Again, this generalized form of EZOP cannot be verified without specifying the class of preferences. In the class R, the results of propositions 2 and 4 generalize easily to the multivariate case. For every pair (i, j), let κ i j denote the minimal order at which F π (.|c i , e) and F π (.|c j , e) can be ranked according to inverse stochastic dominance for all π. According to proposition 4, integrated gap curve dominance for each pair of types c i and c j provides a necessary and sufficient condition for EZOP between the two types over the subclass R κ i j . This condition is, however, necessary only for the whole class R.
Proposition 5. EZOP between multiple types over the set of preferences
The proof is based on the same arguments used in the proof of proposition 4. What is different from proposition 4 is that while we know that F π (.|c i , e) and F π (.|c j , e) can be ranked at the order of dominance κ i j , the direction of dominance is a priori undetermined. This explains why gap dominance should hold in absolute value.
Definition 2 makes the "identity" of each type relevant for defining equalization of opportunity, since the extent of advantage between any pair of types (c i , c j ) under π = 0 is compared with the extent of advantage between the same two types under π = 1. One may challenge this view and claim that only the magnitude of the gaps (and not the identity of the types involved) is relevant for defining equalization of opportunity. One way to implement this idea is through anonymous criteria of equalization between multiple types, where the type label is replaced with the type rank in the order of advantage. We formally develop these criteria and provide testable implications in the online appendix.
B. Aggregation across Circumstances
Definition 2 is demanding and may fail to be satisfied empirically, as it requires that the welfare gap falls for every pair from a possibly large number of types. As a result, the EZOP criterion allows only a partial ordering of social states. Furthermore, it might be argued that a small increase in the opportunity gap between two types might be compensated by a fall in the opportunity gap between another pair of types. This suggests aggregating welfare gaps across pairs of circumstances into a scalar measure.
Such aggregation requires selecting two value functions. The first function, W , evaluates the opportunities available to each type. The second function, V , aggregates the welfare levels across types into a single value of social welfare. For a pair of functions V and W , one can define an inequality of opportunity indicator (IO V W ) for each social state π:
Restrictions have to be imposed on V in order to obtain a scalar measure that is consistent with the EZOP principle. Note that the inequality condition that appears in definition 2 amounts to requesting that the vector of type-specific welfare levels in state π = 1, (W (F 1 (.|c 1 , e) ) , . . . , W (F 1 (.|c T , e))) can be obtained from the same vector in state π = 0 by applying a series of progressive Pigou-Dalton welfare transfers and, possibly, a lump-sum welfare transfer to all types. This implies that V should be consistent with the Pigou-Dalton transfers principle and translation invariant. Hence, up to an increasing transformation, V should be an absolute inequality index (Moyes, 1987) .
Our inequality of opportunity indicator is thus a measure of between-types welfare inequality, computed on the basis of a specific function W using an absolute inequality index. If EZOP is satisfied for a particular W , then IO IA W (1) ≤ IO IA W (0) for any absolute inequality index, denoted IA.
As an example of V , consider the absolute Gini coefficient (Chakravarty, 1988) , which is the standard Gini coefficient multiplied by the mean. If types have different relative frequencies in the population, p c , it is natural to account for type frequency when computing between-type inequality.
This yields the following inequality of opportunity indicator:
IO
Gini W equals the average absolute welfare gap, across all pairs of circumstances, computed for function W .
Equations (3) and (4) encompass several inequality of opportunity indices suggested in the literature. Lefranc et al. (2008) introduce the Gini opportunity index, defined as
where μ c is the mean outcome conditional on circumstance c and μ is the population mean, while G c is the Gini coefficient for type c. Alternatively, using the function W (F π (.|c, e)) = μ c μ in equation (4) yields the intertype relative Gini coefficient.
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The indices introduced in Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) can also be seen as special cases of equation (3). Their inequality index can be written as I (μ c 1 , . . . , μ c T ). In terms of the notation in equation (3), this implies that the function V is replaced by a standard inequality index. Since both papers advocate using relative inequality indices, one may worry that this produces inequality indices that are not consistent with the EZOP criterion. However, in the case of relative inequality indices, we have I (μ c 1 , . . . , μ c T ) = I (
). Thus, one can view the inequality of opportunity indices of Checchi and Peragine (2010) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) as relying on the relative type-specific mean income to evaluate the expected welfare, W , of any type. Furthermore, this specific measure of welfare has a constant mean equal to 1 in each state. Hence, for such a function W , requesting that the function V is translation invariant is irrelevant, and we can simply request that V is consistent with the Pigou-Dalton principle, which is indeed satisfied by any relative inequality index I. An important implication of this discussion is that a relative approach to inequality of opportunity can be developed, within the setting of this paper, by applying the gap curve dominance criterion to the mean-normalized income distributions. This allows generalizing the relative inequality of opportunity indices introduced in the literature.
C. Aggregation in the Effort Dimension
Let us now consider a situation where effort can be summarized by a scalar indicator e ∈ R + . We refer to the distribution of effort within a type as G(e|c, π).
Assume first that effort is realized and observable. This corresponds to what has been referred to in the EOP literature as an ex post situation (Fleurbaey & Peragine, 2013) . A straightforward extension of definition 2 to the multiple effort setting can be made by requiring equalization to hold at every effort level, which can be assessed with ideal data.
In most existing data sets, however, information on effort is missing. In this context, it is only possible to observe for each type its outcome distribution, given by
In the presence of luck, the distribution of outcome of a given type arises from a mixture of luck and effort factors.
The ex ante approach. The distributions F π (.|c) are interesting in their own right and relevant for opportunity equalization. Each distribution captures the opportunity sets associated with different types in an ex ante perspective, that is, before the effort choices are made. If EZOP judgments are made without knowing in advance what individual effort choices will be, the ex post level of effort could be treated as luck. This amounts to assuming that all individuals in a type exert similar effort. One may further assume that effort levels are comparable across types, as discussed below. This comes close in spirit to the analysis of Van de gaer (1993) . In this case, equalization should be decided on the basis of the outcome distributions of each type, F π (y|c):
Definition 3 (ex ante EZOP between multiple types).
Moving from state π = 0 to π = 1 equalizes opportunity ex ante over the set of circumstances C on the set of preferences P if and only if for all preferences W ∈ P, for all
According to this definition, opportunities are equalized if preferences agree that the gaps between the expected opportunity sets associated with every pair of circumstances fall with the change in social state. When P = R, proposition 5 can be used to identify ex ante EZOP.
18 This suggests using empirical gap curves based on observable distributions, conditional on circumstances alone, to assess ex ante EZOP.
The relationship between ex ante and ex post EZOP. Ex ante and ex post EZOP correspond to different concepts of equalization. Empirically assessing the ex ante perspective is less demanding in terms of data. Yet a key question is whether the ex ante distributions can also be used to evaluate ex post EZOP.
First, consider the Roemerian setting where luck plays no role. Individuals with circumstances c and effort e in state 18 In this case, proposition 5 has to be reformulated using distributions of outcomes conditional on circumstances. A necessary condition for ex ante EZOP between multiple types is that
π are assigned a single value of outcome Y π (c, e). Hence, ex post equalization amounts to require that for all (c, c ) and all e, |Y 0 (c, e) − Y 0 (c , e)| ≥ |Y 1 (c, e) − Y 1 (c , e)|. The Roemerian concept of effort requires, on a priori grounds, that effort be defined such that its distribution is independent of type. 19 Roemer further assumes that the outcome function Y π (c, e) is strictly increasing in e. In this case, the individual effort within a type can be identified by the rank in the type-specific outcome distribution, e ≡ p = F π (y|c), and we have Y π (c, e) = F −1 π (p|c). Ex post EZOP in this setting is thus equivalent to requiring ex ante absolute gap curve dominance-that is, for all p ∈ [0, 1]:
Hence, ex post EZOP can be tested with ex ante data alone. When the ex ante distributions can be ranked according to stochastic dominance, we can establish the equivalence between gap curve dominance and ex ante dominance. This implies that ex ante EZOP is equivalent to ex post EZOP when types can be ranked ex ante.
Next, let us turn to the general setting where luck and effort distributions are not degenerate. In this case, the relationship between ex ante and ex post equalization cannot be established without further assumptions. Consider first a simple example with two circumstances, c and c , and many effort levels. Assume that for all effort levels, type c dominates c at the first order. In this case, ex post EZOP requires that for all e, |F 0 (y|c, e) − F 0 (y|c , e)| ≥ |F 1 (y|c, e) − F 1 (y|c , e)|. Assume further that effort is distributed independent of type and state. Under these two assumptions, we have, using equation (5), |F π (y|c) − F π (y|c )| = |F π (y|c, e) − F π (y|c , e)|dG(e). This allows us to establish that rejection of ex ante EZOP implies rejection of ex post EZOP. However, this is valid only under the two maintained assumptions. Unfortunately, these assumptions cannot be tested empirically, without observing effort. This shows that in the general case, ex post equalization cannot be identified using ex ante comparisons.
IV. Child Care Expansion and Equalization of Opportunity in Norway
Recently, policymakers in both the United States and Europe have been pushing for expanding access to child care in an effort to alleviate early-life differences across socioeconomic groups. Indeed, early-childhood investments are often seen as the means par excellence to equalize life chances (Blau & Currie, 2006) . To illustrate the usefulness of our framework for policy evaluations, we now apply it to evaluate the long-term impact of a large-scale child care reform in Norway. 19 The argument is that since individuals cannot be held responsible for their type, they should not be held accountable for the association between their "effort" and their type. One may further require that the distribution of effort is also independent of the state. For a complete discussion of identification issues in Roemer's model, see O'Neill, Sweetman, and Van de gaer (2000) and Lefranc et al. (2009) .
The Kindergarten Act passed the Norwegian parliament in June 1975. It assigned responsibility for child care to local municipalities and was followed by large increases in federal funding. The reform constituted a substantial positive shock to the supply of subsidized child care, which had been severely constrained by limited public funds. The child care coverage rate for 3-to 6-year-olds increased from less than 10% in 1975 to over 28% by 1979. 20 Our objective is to assess whether the expansion of child care equalized opportunity among Norwegian children. The outcome variable we focus on is individual yearly earnings at ages 30 to 36. Our circumstance variable is parental earnings during early childhood. Havnes and Mogstad (2011) show that the child care expansion had, on average, positive long-run effects on education and labor market attachment. Havnes and Mogstad (2015) document that the effects were highly heterogeneous: gains were clustered at the lower end of the overall earnings distribution and were on average larger for children from disadvantaged backgrounds. Whether the distribution of gains for disadvantaged children dominates the one of advantaged children remains, however, an open question.
We extend Havnes and Mogstad (2015) by looking at the full distributional consequences of the child care expansion within family background and by bringing the EZOP framework to bear on these results. Specifically, we examine to what extent the expansion of child care equalized children's earnings distributions as adults, conditional on parental earnings deciles.
A. Empirical Implementation
Assessing whether the Kindergarten Act equalized opportunities across Norwegian children requires two sets of outcome distributions: For each circumstance, we look at the distribution of observed outcomes by family background among children who have experienced the child care expansion and the counterfactual distribution that would have prevailed in the absence of the reform. Following Havnes and Mogstad (2015) , we apply a difference-in-difference (DiD) approach, exploiting the fact that the supply shocks to subsidized child care were larger in some areas than in others. Specifically, we compare the adult earnings of children aged 3 to 6 years old before and after the reform, from municipalities where child care expanded a lot (the treatment group) and municipalities with little or no increase in child care coverage (the comparison group).
We focus on the early expansion, which likely reflects the abrupt slackening of constraints on the supply side caused by the reform rather than a spike in the local demand. We consider the period 1976 to 1979 as the child care expansion period. To define the treatment and comparison group, we order municipalities according to the percentage point increase in child care coverage rates over the expansion period. We 20 For details about the program and data, see Havnes and Mogstad (2011) . then separate the sample at the median, letting the upper half be treatment municipalities and the lower half be comparison municipalities. To define the prereform and postreform groups, we exploit the fact that children born from 1967 to 1969 enter primary school before the expansion period starts, while children born from 1973 to 1976 are in child care age after the expansion period has ended. Mogstad (2011, 2015) show that the expansion of child care is not explained by observable characteristics.
To assess the impact of the reform on the distribution of children's earnings, conditional on parental earnings, we estimate the following equation:
where 1{·} is the indicator function, y it are average yearly earnings in 2006 to 2009 of child i born in year t, and y is a threshold value of earnings discussed below. T i is a dummy equal to 1 if the child is from a treatment municipality and 0 otherwise, and P t is a dummy equal to 1 for postreform cohorts (born 1973-1976) and 0 for prereform cohorts (born 1967 to 1969) . γ t is a birth cohort fixed effect, and is the error term. The vector x it contains a fourth-order polynomial in the average yearly earnings of the child's parents when the child was the age for needing child care, that is,
21 Vectors β 0 (y), β 1 (y), β 2 (y), and β 3 (y) have dimension (1 × 4).
The vector β 3 (y) provides DiD estimates of how the reform affected the earnings distribution of exposed children. In the spirit of standard DiD, the estimator uses the observed change in the distribution around the value y, from before to after treatment, as an estimate of the change that would have occurred in the treatment group over this period in the absence of treatment. The identifying assumption is that the change in population shares from before to after treatment around a given level of earnings would be the same in the treatment group as in the comparison group, in the absence of the treatment.
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Note that equation (6) allows for heterogeneity in the effect of the reform on the distribution of earnings along two dimensions. First, β 3 (y) is a function of the threshold earnings, so the effect of the reform is allowed to vary along the earnings distribution of the children. Second, since β 3 (y) is interacted with a polynomial in parental earnings (x it ), the effect of the reform is allowed to vary according to family background. Equation (6) provides estimates defined in terms of changes in probability mass at each value y. From these, we can compute the change in earnings induced by the reform by rescaling with an estimate of the density at y (Firpo, Fortin, & Lemieux, 2009 ). When y is a quantile, this yields an estimate of the quantile treatment effect (QTE).
Our EZOP criterion rests on a comparison of the effects of the reform at quantiles of the earnings distribution conditional on circumstances. For each circumstance c and each quantile p ∈ [0, 1], define Q 1 (p|c) = F −1 (p|c, T = 1, P = 1) as the value of the p th quantile in the actual distribution of earnings among treated children, conditional on circumstances. The estimated QTE at quantile p for children with circumstances c is defined as
where C it denotes the circumstances of individual i born in cohort t and f (·|·) denotes the density of the earnings distribution F (·|·). Because QT E (p|c) estimates the impact of the treatment, we readily construct an estimate of the counterfactual quantile in the absence of treatment as Q 0 (p|c)
In the empirical application, we use the earnings decile of the child's parents to define circumstances. Parental earnings are used here as a catch-all measure of individual circumstances. 23 We estimate equation (6) using OLS at each percentile of the earnings distribution conditional on circumstances. 24 We then use a kernel estimate of the density from this distribution to construct our estimate of QT E (p|c). Our estimation sample is based on Norwegian registry data and covers children born to married mothers, who constitute about 93% of the relevant cohorts. Standard errors are obtained using a nonparametric bootstrap with 300 replications. Based on our estimates of the actual and counterfactual outcome distributions and on the bootstrapped covariances, we implement stochastic dominance tests, along the lines of Andreoli (2018) , as discussed in the online appendix.
B. Results for Three Classes
Defining children's circumstances from parental earnings deciles involves a large number of pairwise comparisons. To clarify the intuition behind the comparisons, we first focus on three types in the population: children whose parents had earnings in the second, the fifth, and the ninth decile, respectively. For expositional simplicity, we refer to these simply as lower-class, middle-class, and upper-class children.
We start by analyzing the extent of inequality of opportunity before the implementation of the child care expansion. Panel a in figure 1 presents the counterfactual distributions Q 0 (p|c) that would have been observed in the absence of the policy (π = 0). The figure shows first-order stochas-tic dominance when we compare any pair of distributions. Equality of opportunity is thus clearly violated. Furthermore, for all preferences, there is a clear ordering of family types, with upper-class children doing better than middle-class children and middle-class children doing better than lower-class children.
Panel b in figure 1 shows the impact of the child care expansion on the earnings distribution of children in these three groups. The dashed line presents the QTE for middle-class children. Overall, the effect of the child care expansion in this group is relatively modest. However, there is significant heterogeneity in the impact of the policy: within the middle class, effects are positive at the bottom of the earnings distribution and turn negative at the upper end of the distribution. The dotted line gives the effect on upper-class children. In this group, the reform has a modest positive impact for children in the bottom of the conditional distribution but a large negative impact in the top of the distribution. Finally, the solid line provides estimates of the effect of the child care expansion for lower-class children. On average, lower-class children seem to benefit more from the child care expansion than children from the middle and upper classes. Furthermore, the heterogeneity in the effect of child care stands in marked contrast with what was observed in the other two groups: Among lower-class children, the reform had a small positive effect in the bottom of the distribution but an increasingly large and positive effect as we move up the conditional earnings distribution. This suggests two likely conclusions. First, on average, child care appears substitutable for parental resources, captured here by the class of origin. Second, the impact of child care seems complementary to the child's idiosyncratic resources within the lower class, while the opposite seems to be true in the middle and upper classes.
Panel c of figure 1 presents the conditional distribution of earnings after the policy implementation (π = 1). The figure shows first-order stochastic dominance when we compare any pair of distributions. Hence, equality of opportunity is rejected, even after the implementation of the reform. However, compared to panel a, the gap between any pair of curves seems to have fallen at almost every quantile of the earnings distribution, suggesting that the child care policy might have partially equalized opportunities across the three classes.
To implement our EZOP procedure, we present in panels d to f the estimated gap curves from pairwise comparisons of children from different family types under both social states, alongside gap curve differences between these states with a 99% confidence interval band. Since the conditional distributions can be ordered according to first-order stochastic dominance, we may invoke proposition 2: gap curve dominance provides a necessary and sufficient condition for equalization of opportunity.
Two main features stand out. First, in both social states, gap curves are virtually always positive. This reflects the fact that all groups are ordered according to stochastic dominance both with and without the child care reform. Second, the actual gap curve (π = 1) is almost always below the counterfactual FIGURE 1.-CHILD EARNINGS DISTRIBUTIONS, QUANTILE TREATMENT EFFECTS, AND GAP CURVES "Lower," "middle," and "upper class" refer to selected parental earnings deciles. Gap curves are defined as the vertical distance between the conditional quantile functions of the different classes. Since the CDFs are ordered, the gap curves are always positive. Gap curve differences correspond to the vertical gap between the gap curves in the actual and the counterfactual states. Confidence intervals for the difference in gap curves at every conditional quantile are bootstrapped.
gap curve (π = 0). This indicates that the reform reduced inequality of opportunity between all pairs of types. This fact is clarified by looking at the gap curve differences: While the difference is small and not statistically significant at the bottom of the distribution, the difference becomes positive and strongly statistically significant as we move up in the distribution.
The formal assessment of EZOP rests on joint tests of stochastic dominance, in each pairwise comparison of groups, for the actual distributions, the counterfactual distributions, and the gap curves. Results of these tests are presented in table 1. Panels A and B present test statistics for the counterfactual and actual settings, respectively. We test three distinct hypotheses: that distributions of the two groups are equal; that the distribution of the underprivileged group first-order stochastic dominates the distribution of the privileged group; and that the third hypothesis is the reverse of the second one. Not surprisingly, only the third hypothesis cannot be rejected in all comparisons.
Finally, panel C presents the main tests of equalization of opportunity. First, the null hypothesis is that the reform had no impact on inequality of opportunity (neutrality). This hypothesis is strongly rejected by the data. Second, the null hypothesis is that the reform equalized outcomes across children from different classes (equalization). This hypothesis cannot be rejected by the data, with p-values above 0.38. Third, the null hypothesis is that the reform disequalized outcomes, increasing inequality of opportunity. In this case, we can again strongly reject the hypothesis in all comparisons.
To summarize, the analysis shows first that the ordering between children from different classes in terms of their labor market performance is quite clear in Norway: upperclass children dominate middle-class children, who dominate lower-class children. Second, the analysis shows that the child care reform in 1975 did indeed substantially equalize the opportunities across children from different classes. Using the Gini-type evaluation function, we can quantify the effect of the policy. For low and middle classes, results indicate that the reform had a positive effect: Their opportunities increased by 4.3% and 3%, respectively. In contrast, the value of the opportunity set of the upper class increased by only a modest 1%, which turns out to be statistically insignificant. This differential in growth rates indicates that the lower and middle classes benefited from the policy reform, in both absolute and in relative terms, in the sense that they caught up with the upper class. 25 Third, the QTE estimates show that this equalization came both from positive impacts at the lower end of the distribution and negative impacts at the upper end for many children. This raises a concern about the universal design of the child care expansion, as Havnes and Mogstad (2015) discussed.
C. Results for All Parental Earnings Deciles
We now consider the entire population of children and extend the above group comparisons to all 10 deciles of the parental earnings distribution. The results of the same tests as in table 1 are summarized graphically in figure 2. In each panel, colored squares summarize the results of the tests of the hypothesis of dominance of the groups on the vertical axis over the groups on the horizontal axis. The shading of the squares indicates the p-value for the rejection of the null hypothesis of dominance. Dark squares indicate failure to reject the null hypothesis of dominance (i.e., high p-values), while light squares indicate rejection of the null hypothesis. We also test for equality of the distributions across groups and indicate failure to reject equality with a black bullet inside the square.
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Panels A and B of figure 2 report the results of dominance tests in the counterfactual and the actual states. In both states, the results suggest a strong monotonic relation between parental earnings and the earnings advantage of chil-26 For instance, in figure 2, the squares in row 2, column 9 and in row 9, column 2 compare children from the lower class (D2) to children from the upper class (D9), as in table 1. In panel A, we test for dominance in the counterfactual setting. The dark color in row 9, column 2 indicates the failure to reject dominance D9 over D2. The light color in row 2, column 9 indicates the rejection of dominance of D2 over D9. The absence of bullets in both blocks indicates that we reject equality of the earnings distributions.
dren. Above the diagonal, we universally fail to reject the hypothesis that the earnings distribution of children from higher parental deciles dominates that of children from lower parental deciles. Below the diagonal, we reject that the earnings distribution of lower-decile children dominates that of higher-decile children virtually everywhere. The only exceptions are three central comparisons around the diagonal, where the differences in parental earnings across groups are rather small and equality cannot be rejected. Overall, these tests provide clear evidence of inequality of opportunity for earnings among Norwegian children in both states.
We now turn to the test of equalization of opportunity. Panel C of figure 2 reports the results of gap curve dominance tests for all pairs. For two-thirds of the comparisons (29 out of 45), we find the following pattern. Below the diagonal, we do not reject an improvement in the position of the less advantaged children compared to more advantaged children. Above the diagonal, we do reject an improvement in the position of the more advantaged children compared to less advantaged children. Hence, these results indicate that in most pairwise comparisons, the implementation of the policy significantly decreases the opportunity gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged type.
There are, however, two main exceptions. For ten pairs, we fail to reject both equalization and disequalization. 27 We also find that the gap curves are statistically equal before and after, which indicates that the policy left inequality of opportunity unchanged. Thus, for these pairs, the condition of proposition 2 is also weakly satisfied. The second exception is the comparison of group D1 to groups D3 to D9. In these cases, we reject both the hypothesis of equalization and the hypothesis of disequalization of opportunity. The tests are thus inconclusive: we do not find gap dominance in any direction.
To summarize, we find that pairwise equalization of opportunity is satisfied in 85% of cases. However, most of the comparisons involving D1 are inconclusive, as we cannot conclude in favor of equalization or disequalization. Taken together, the condition stated in proposition 5 is not satisfied for first-order stochastic dominance.
The inconclusive results for group D1 arise from the fact that gap curves intersect. To go beyond, we may investigate the existence of higher-order dominance. In our data, we find that the integrated gap curve of order 3 before the policy is dominated by the gap curve after the policy in the comparison of group D1 to groups D3 to D9. This implies that for all preferences in class R 3 , the child care reform caused disequalization of opportunity for the most disadvantaged group (see the appendix). In summary, in our application with ten types, all preferences in the class R 3 agree in the assessment, over all pairs, of pair-wise EZOP (definition 1). However, the global EZOP condition (proposition 5) is not satisfied in the class R 3 (or in any subclass), as there are pairs for The groups D1 to D10 refer to parental earnings deciles. In each panel, results are for the null hypothesis of dominance of the groups on the vertical axis over the groups on the horizontal axis. Panels A and B report p-values for the tests of first-order stochastic dominance and equality of CDFs for pairs of groups, in the counterfactual and actual regime. Panel C reports p-values of tests of dominance and equality for gap curves performed through QTE comparisons across groups. These tests correspond to the null hypothesis that the distribution of QTEs for the type on the vertical axis dominates (i.e., QTE are always larger) the distribution of QTE for the type on the horizontal axis. Since types are ordered, results below (resp. above) the diagonal, in panel C, correspond to the null hypothesis of opportunity equalization (resp. disequalization). Dark squares indicate the impossibility of rejecting the null hypothesis at conventional confidence levels. Bullets indicate the impossibility of rejecting the null of equality between the distributions. See the online appendix for details on the testing procedure.
which equalization unambiguously prevails and pairs where disequalization is unanimously found. This suggests that EZOP in definition 2 might be difficult to satisfy with a large number of types.
To overcome this lack of unanimous judgment on equalization of opportunity, one may resort to a specific inequality of opportunity index. Using the Gini opportunity index of Lefranc et al. (2008) , we find that unfair inequality decreased by 8.8% as a result of the expansion in the kindergarten provision. 28 This comes as no surprise considering the large number of pairs where equalization of opportunity is found.
Finally, detailed inspection of the distributions reveals that equalization among most of the groups is driven not by a reduction in the gap at the bottom end of the children's distributions but rather by a narrowing of the gap in the middle and upper ends of the distributions. This is explained partly by the fact that estimated effects are rather homogeneous across groups at the lower end of the distribution and partly by the fact that the negative QTE estimates at the upper end of the distribution are particularly large for advantaged groups. Details are in appendix E.3.
V. Conclusion
The first contribution of this paper is theoretical. We develop a new criterion for ranking social states from the equality of opportunity perspective. Our criterion for equalization of opportunity entails a difference-in-differences comparison of outcome distributions conditional on circumstances. First, types are compared within each social state separately, to assess the direction and distribution of unfair advantage across 28 The Gini opportunity indices (standard error) are GO(0) = 0.0358 (0.0013) and GO(1) = 0.0326 (0.001). The p-value for H 0 : GO(0) = GO(1), based on bootstrapped standard errors, is 0.029. all possible pairs of types. Second, differences are taken between social states in order to assess changes in the extent and distribution of unfair advantage.
We propose an innovative model based on comparisons of changes in the economic distance between pairs of distributions. Our criterion requires unanimity, within a large class of preferences, in the evaluation of the fall in the illegitimate advantage enjoyed by one type with respect to another. We study identification procedures and implementation issues, showing the equivalence of our EZOP order with gap curve dominance. In cases where the ordering of types is not unanimous, we proceed by minimally refining the set of potential preferences until agreement is reached. We show that this refinement is easily implementable using inverse stochastic dominance tools. While pair-wise agreement can always be reached for a subset of preferences, agreement across all pairs of types can be challenging to reach when the number of types is large. In such cases, the EZOP criterion can be inconclusive and indicate equalization for some pairs and disequalization for others. The criterion remains, however, informative of which type is driving opportunity disequalization. The robust inequality of opportunity criteria, when inconclusive, can also be aggregated into inequality of opportunity indicators.
Our results extend to the equality of opportunity framework some important results in social welfare ordering. Several authors have demonstrated the equivalence between stochastic dominance orders and social orders in a welfarist context (Atkinson, 1970; Shorrocks, 1983) . Instead of focusing on inequality of outcomes, as in the welfarist approach, our social order criterion is based on modern theories of distributive justice (see also Peragine, 2002) and extends this approach to inequality of opportunity measurement.
Our second contribution is to provide a statistical framework that allows implementing our equalization of opportunity criterion. Our application also underlines that econometric models allowing for heterogeneous effects can be tightly connected to the normative assessment of distributional issues. The recent econometric literature has provided important tools for estimating the heterogeneous impact of policy intervention on some outcome of interest. 29 Since our equalization criterion can be expressed in terms of restrictions on quantile treatment effects, this paper suggests a simple way in which these estimates can be used to assess whether a given policy helps to promote distributive justice.
The third contribution of this paper pertains to the empirical analysis of the effectiveness of early childhood intervention at equalizing life chances. Growing evidence on the role of family background on lifelong earnings potential (Björk-lund & Salvanes, 2011; Black & Devereux, 2010) has brought educational policies to the forefront as potential tools for alleviating differences stemming from family background. This has taken particular prominence due to theory and evidence suggesting that skills formation early in life may be crucial in determining children's trajectories (Cunha & Heckman, 2007) . Expanding access to quality child care may be expected to equalize opportunities among treated children by weakening the dependence between family background and children's development. While studies of targeted programs often find positive effects (for a survey, see Blau & Currie, 2006) , the literature on universal programs is smaller and findings are mixed (see Havnes & Mogstad, 2015 and references there). We extend this literature by providing evidence on the impact of a universally available large-scale child care program on long-run equality of opportunity.
Applying our framework to evaluate the introduction of universally available child care in Norway, we conclude that kindergarten expansion indeed equalizes opportunities among children from most family backgrounds. Two important caveats should be noted. First, echoing results in Havnes and Mogstad (2015) , our results show that the equalization of opportunity resulting from the reform is driven importantly by reduced earnings at the upper end of the earnings distribution for affected children. An important question is whether resources devoted to provide child care for children from upper-class families could be reallocated to improve the quality or uptake of child care for lower-class children.
Second, although there is strong agreement on equalization of opportunity for the vast majority of groups, it is not possible to conclude completely in favor of equalization. In fact, the policy seems to increase the gap for the least successful children in the most disadvantaged group compared to most other types. This result indicates that the Kindergarten Act produced relatively low returns for these children, leaving them even further behind compared to the children from somewhat less disadvantaged backgrounds, who benefited 29 Abadie, Angrist, and Imbens (2002) , Athey and Imbens (2006) and Firpo et al. (2009) , among others, are important contributions to this literature. The RIF-DiD estimator of Havnes and Mogstad (2015) belongs to the same econometric vein.
handsomely. This finding casts a shadow on the effectiveness of universal child care for the neediest children and deserves further investigation.
